Economie

Le 29 janv. 2026 de 13h00 à 14h00

Yao Thibaut KPEGLI (UMR TREE) 

à Pau, en salle des thèses DEG; à Bayonne en salle 110 via Teams 

Abstract : 

We show that seminal works on trust decisions are not the most effective to separate the effects of betrayal costs from those of strategic ambiguity attitudes and beliefs. We then propose a more robust experimental and estimation strategy. Our experiment also tests for the difference in strategic ambiguity attitudes over asymmetric events (i.e, events with unequal beliefs of occurring) in the trust game and over symmetric events in coordination games. We find evidence of betrayal costs leading trustors to exhibit betrayal aversion. Also, people are less pessimistic about asymmetric events. This supports Ellsberg’s (2011) belief that ambiguity seeking is more frequent than aversion, as asymmetric events likely outnumber symmetric ones. They also demonstrate greater likelihood insensitivity, as forming beliefs is more cognitively demanding for asymmetric events.